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Recently, state governments have begun to claim a copyright interest in their
official publishedcodes of law, in particulararguingthat ancillarymaterialssuch
as annotations to the statutory text are subject to state-held copyright protection
because those materials are not binding commands that carry the force of law.
Litigation over this issue and a vigorous policy debate are ongoing.
This article contributes a historical perspective to this ongoing debate over
copyright in texts relating to the law. It reviews the history of government
production and use of annotations, commentaries, legislative debates, and other
related information relevant to the law but not pure statutory text,from Rome and
China to England and America. These historicalepisodes reveal three lessons of
relevance to the debate. First,there is consistent recognition that "the law" is not
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limited to binding statutory language. Second, exclusivity over nonbinding legal
texts such as annotations, whether through copyright or other means, confers
undue power on government and the legal profession over the public. Third,
annotationsand other nonbinding legal texts are historically distinguishablefrom
case reports or private treatises,contrary to the argumentsgenerally proffered by
the copyright-claimingstates. These lessons militate toward broadexclusion from
copyright of state-authoredinformative legal texts, whether binding or not.

IN T RO D U C T ION ......................................................................................................

19 3

B A CK G ROUN D ..............................................................................................

19 7

A . State Publication ofAnnotated Codes ...................................................
B . The Public.Resource.Org Litigation......................................................

197
199

OFFICIAL ANNOTATIONS HAVE LONG BEEN EDICTS OF GOVERNMENT
AND INTEGRAL PARTS OF THE LAW ..............................................................

200

1.

II.

A. Rome: Official Commentaries Were Jus Scriptafrom the Republic
Th rough J ustinian ..................................................................................
B. Dynastic China: Official Annotations LiterallyIntertwined with
S tatu tory L aw .........................................................................................
C. England, 1485 1490: Nonbinding "Englished"Law Secures the
Crown 's A uth ority..................................................................................
D. England, 1520 1640: PromulgatedExplanations of Law
CounteractA bsolutistM onarchy ...........................................................
E. England, 1640 1642: Printingof ParliamentaryDebates Plants
Seeds of Dem ocracy...............................................................................
F. GreatBritain and New York, 1762 1796: Suppression of Debate
PrintingSparks Demandfor Freedom of Speech ..................................
G. Virginia, 1846 1887: The Commonwealth Annotates Official
Codes Despite FlagrantCopying ..........................................................

III.

20 1
203
205
207
209
211
213

HISTORY COUNSELS A CONSERVATIVE APPROACH TO STATE ASSERTION
OF COPYRIGHT IN LEGAL M ATERIALS ..........................................................

A. Edicts of Government, andLaw Generally,Are Not Limited to Acts
of B inding L egal F orce ..........................................................................
B. Control over the Reasons and Explanations of Law Confers Undue
Power on Government and the Legal Profession ..................................
C. Unlike Case Reports or Treatises,Annotated Official Codes Are a
TraditionalState Dictum .......................................................................
C ON C L U SIO N ..........................................................................................................

216
216
218
219

22 1

N.Y.U. JOURNAL OF INTELL. PROP. & ENT. LAW

[Vol. 9:2

INTRODUCTION

The antecedents to copyright law are full of colorful historical episodes, but
few outdo the time that the Mayor of London was thrown injail. 1 In 1771, the British
House of Commons initiated a campaign against several newspaper publishers,
exercising an early copyright-like power to restrict publication of its speeches and
debates. 2 Most of the publishers acquiesced in Commons' assertion of
Ccparliamentary privilege," but one, John Miller of the London Evening Post, had a
different idea.3 Executing a plan hatched with London alderman John Wilkes, a
renowned hero of freedom on both sides of the Atlantic, Miller lay in wait for
Parliament's messenger to come arrest him.4 When the messenger arrived, the Lord
Mayor of London, Brass Crosby, asserted sole jurisdiction for arrests in his city and
then charged the messenger with false imprisonment.5 Enraged at this act of
defiance, Commons summoned Crosby to answer for his actions.6 Crosby was
adjudged in breach of parliamentary privilege, and followed by a throng of
Londoners cheering him on for his bravery, the Lord Mayor paraded himself into
custody in the Tower of London.
Thankfully, the Printers' Case of 1771 was a dying gasp of legislative
restrictions on reporting debates-Congress has not imprisoned anyone recently 8but governments today appear no less keen on cutting off the flow of important legal
texts they produce.9 In Code Revision Commission ex rel. General Assembly of
Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org,Inc.,10 the State of Georgia asserts that it possesses
1 See generally infra text accompanying notes 123-127.
See Peter D.G. Thomas, The Beginning of ParliamentaryReporting in Newspapers, 1768-

2

1774, 74 ENG. HIST. REV. 623, 628-30 (1959).
' See Horace Bleackley, Life of John Wilkes 261 (J. Lane 1917).
4 See id.; The Annual Register, or a View of History, Politics, and Literature, for the Year
1771, 63-64 (6th ed., London, W. Otridge & Son 1803) [hereinafter The Annual Register].
5 See 17 THE PARL. HIST. ENG., 96-97 (1813); THE ANNUAL REGISTER, supra note 4, at 64.
6 See 17 THE PARL. HIST. ENG., supra note 5, at 102-04.
7 See id. at 157-58; THE ANNUAL REGISTER, supra note 4, at 66-69; BLEACKLEY, supra note
3, at 262.
8 See Amber Phillips, How Would Congress Jail Trump Officials? History Says It's Not Easy,
WASH. POST (May 15, 2019, 1:08 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/
2019/05/15/how-would-congress-j ail-trump-official s-hi story-says-its-not-easy/.
9 See, e.g., Brief for Arkansas et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 3, Georgia v.
Public.Resource.Org, Inc., 139 S. Ct. 2746 (2019) [hereinafter Brief for Arkansas et al.] (No. 181150) (arguing on behalf of 14 states that states require copyright protections in their official
codes).
10 Code Revision Comm'n ex rel. Gen. Assembly of Ga. v. Public.Resource.Org, Inc. (Code
Revision Comm 'n II), 906 F.3d 1229 (11 th Cir. 2018), cert. granted,Public.Resource.Org,Inc.,
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a copyright sufficient to prevent the copying or redistribution of the Official Code of
GeorgiaAnnotated, the sole official source of law in the state.11 The state concedes
that the statutory language itself is not subject to copyright protection by virtue of
its being an edict of government. 12 Yet, it argues that ancillary matter in the official
code, in particular the annotations containing citations to case law and legislative
history, are not edicts of government for purposes of copyright law and thus are
amenable to copyright protection sufficient to prevent copying of the official code
in toto. 13

139 S. Ct. 2746 (2019). On April 27, 2020, just prior to this article's publication, the Supreme
Court issued a decision in favor of Public.Resource.Org, Inc., holding that no copyright inheres in
"non-binding, explanatory legal materials created by a legislative body vested with the authority
to make law." Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, Inc. (Public.Resource.Org Opinion), No. 18-1150,
slip op. at 1-2 (U.S. Apr. 27, 2020) (emphasis omitted). The historical analysis in this article is not
affected by the Court's decision, but a few notes are worthwhile. The majority opinion by Chief
Justice Roberts appeals to the unfairness that could occur if copyright law enables the state to
prepare an "economy-class version of the Georgia Code" and an annotated one for "first-class
readers." Id.at 17. That analysis closely follows the discussion below, infra Section II.B, on how
copyright in legal annotations can hand undue power to the state and members of the legal
profession, who will tend to be those "first-class readers." Justices Thomas and Ginsburg, in
separate dissents, premise their views in favor of copyrights in legal annotations on the notion that
those annotations carry no legal force. See Public.Resource.Org Opinion, No. 18-1150, slip op. at
7 (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("[T]hese annotations do not even purport to embody the will of the
people because they are not law."); id.at 3 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (arguing that annotations
should be copyrightable because they "are descriptive rather than prescriptive"). Yet these
dissenting views disregard the important political role that nonbinding pronouncements of
government have played throughout history. See infra Section III.A. Finally, Justice Thomas
attempts to distinguish judicial opinions from legislative work on the grounds that in 17th century
England, judicial opinions were the property of the sovereign. See Public.Resource.OrgOpinion,
No. 18-1150, slip op. at 6 (Thomas, J., dissenting). That argument overlooks the fact that the works
of Parliament in that historical period were also a matter of sovereign exclusivity under the royal
prerogative. See infra text accompanying notes 90-93.
11 See GA. CODE ANN. § 1-1-1; Brief for Petitioners at 20-21, Public.Resource.Org,Inc., 139
S. Ct. 2746 (2019) (No. 18-1150) [hereinafter Brief for Petitioners].
12 See Brief for Petitioners, supra note 11, at 20; cf. State v. Harrison Co., 548 F. Supp. 110,
113-14 (N.D. Ga. 1982) (citing relevant case law).
13 See Brief for Petitioners, supra note 11, at 20 ("Properly stated, the question here is whether
the OCGA's annotations,which lack the force of law, are eligible for copyright protection.").
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Much has been written on the merits of copyright in state legal texts such as
annotated legal codes, from perspectives of copyright law, 14 constitutional rights,15
economic incentives, 16 effects on key industries, 17 and public policy.18 Yet scant
attention has been paid to history.19 This is unfortunate, because a review of the
history of law and legal publication in fact reveals numerous useful precedents that
inform the debate on copyright protection for texts of the law. History in particular
can answer the question fundamental to the State of Georgia's contentions: whether
there is in fact a clear distinction between binding statutes carrying the force of law,
which are decidedly not copyrightable, and all other authorial products of
government.
To fill this historical void in the record, this article surveys nonbinding
pronouncements, particularly attached to statutes or codes of law, across time and
around the world, from Rome and China to England and America. This historical
14

See, e.g., Leslie A. Street & David R. Hansen, Who Owns the Law? Why We Must Restore

Public Ownership of Legal Publishing, 26 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 205, 224-26 (2019); Brief for
American Intellectual Property [Law] Association as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent,
Public.Resource.Org,Inc., 139 S. Ct. 2746 (2019) (No. 18-1150); Brief for The Copyright
Alliance as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Public.Resource.Org,Inc., 139 S. Ct. 2746
(2019) (No. 18-1150).
15 See, e.g., Brief for American Civil Liberties Union et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Respondent, Public.Resource.Org,Inc., 139 S. Ct. 2746 (2019) (No. 18-1150); Brief for Center
for Democracy and Technology and Cato Institute as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent, at 413, Public.Resource.Org,Inc., 139 S. Ct. 2746 (2019) (No. 18-1150).
16 See,
e.g., Deborah Tussey, Owning the Law: IntellectualPropertyRights in PrimaryLaw, 9
Fordham Intell.Prop. Media & Ent. L.J. 173, 225-31 (1998).
17 See, e.g., Brief for American Library Association et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Respondent, Public.Resource.Org,Inc., 139 S. Ct. 2746 (2019) (No. 18-1150); Brief for Matthew
Bender & Co., Inc. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Public.Resource.Org,Inc., 139 S.
Ct. 2746 (2019) (No. 18-1150); Brief for Internet Association as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Respondent, Public.Resource.Org,Inc., 139 S. Ct. 2746 (2019) (No. 18-1150).
" See, e.g., Tussey, supra note 16, at 231-33 (considering constitutional objectives for
copyright); Irina Y. Dmitrieva, State Ownership of Copyrights in Primary Law Materials, 23
HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 81, 115 (2000) (arguing that "the state's ownership of copyright in
primary law materials runs afoul of the fundamental public policy principle that citizens in a
democratic society must have uninhibited access to the laws"). The author deeply regrets being
unable to cite every excellent brief filed by his colleagues and others in this litigation.
19 The scholar who comes closest to doing so is Professor Dingledy of William & Mary Law
School, though his research focuses on historical access to the law generally, rather than the
particular issue of nonbinding legal texts. See Frederick W. Dingledy, From Stele to Silicon:
Publicationof Statutes, PublicAccess to the Law, and the Uniform ElectronicLegalMaterialAct,
111 L. LIBR. J. 165 (2019) [hereinafter Dingledy 2019]. The author extends special thanks to
Professor Dingledy for a great deal of assistance with his research.
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review-which traverses a Roman whistleblower, the Justinian Code, a dark side of
Confucianism, English libertarianism, New York suppressing the press, and the
Mayor of London being thrown in jail-reveals multiple important lessons that
question the basis upon which Georgia's argument stands.
First, "the law," or that class of government edicts for which the interest of
unrestricted citizen access is at its apex, is not limited to statutes of binding force.
Law, and access thereto, serves many purposes: advising citizens on the state's
normative views, crystallizing popular opinion on future policy, and delineating the
relationship between citizen and state. Nonbinding pronouncements serve these
purposes too, by demonstrating the logic, motivations, and reasoning of the
sovereign, which is why governments have repeatedly treated nonbinding
pronouncements as part and parcel of the law. A determinative distinction between
binding law and other state-authored works has not existed for millennia.
Second, concealment of nonbinding legal pronouncements has long handed
undue power to both the state and the legal bar. Where the reasons behind the law
are not made available to the public, the sovereign enjoys outsized discretion over
citizens. Furthermore, lawyers enjoy outsized power to shape the law toward their
interests rather than the public's. These imbalances in power, both plainly antidemocratic and anti-libertarian in the broadest senses of those terms, demonstrate a
danger in allowing states to have control over nonbinding state-authored works that
often contain the reasons and logic of the sovereign and the law.
Third, states such as Georgia often support their claims for copyright by
analogizing their annotations to privately authored case reports and legal treatises,
both of which historically have been subject to copyright.2 ° Yet, history shows that
annotations to the law are unlike legal treatises and case reports. Historically, those
private writings have been the domain of non-state-actor compilers; 21 as such, they
are not traditional edicts of government. By contrast, codes of law-complete with
annotations-have long been pronouncements of the sovereign's intentions. 22 To
treat state-authored annotations like a private case report or treatise would thus be
incongruous with history.
These lessons ultimately point in the same direction: exclusivity in stateauthored legal texts, even those that do not carry direct legal force, can have and

20

See infra note 180 and accompanying text.

21 See infra notes 186-192 and accompanying text.
22 See infta notes 181-185 and accompanying text.
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have had grave legal consequences, and important public interests are served by
ensuring that those works are broadly available to the public without restriction.
To be sure, little of this history speaks directly to the doctrines of copyright
law. But the determinative principles for the relevant edicts-of-government doctrine
under copyright law have always reached beyond the mere text of the statute. Those
determinative principles are founded upon the relationship of a sovereign to its
citizens, and what the state may withhold from them, regardless of the legal means.
The relevant history is that of the law and how states have published or withheld it.
This article proceeds as follows. Section I gives a brief introduction to the
practice of legal publication of annotated codes and the litigation that has given rise
to the debate over copyright in legal texts.23 Section II turns to historical episodes
relating to annotations, commentaries, legislative histories, and other nonbinding but
official texts of the law.24 Section III synthesizes conclusions from these historical
instances to draw lessons for the consequences of state-owned copyrights in those
nonbinding but official texts.25 The final section concludes.2 6
I
BACKGROUND

To set the stage for the historical discussion of state involvement with
nonbinding but official legal texts, this section provides a brief background on the
situation that has given rise to copyright litigation over annotations to official state
legal codes.
A. State Publication ofAnnotated Codes
When legislatures enact laws, the record of those enactments is not
automatically organized into topical volumes.2 7 Statutes, or "session laws," have
historically been organized serially in order of enactment.2 8 Indeed, in early England,
the statutes were literally sewn together in serial order to form rolls of attached
parchment, which gives rise to the term "enrollment" of laws.29
See infta Section I.
24 See infta Section II.
21 See infta Section III.
26 See ilnfa Conclusion.
27 See, e.g., Erwin C. Surrency, The PublicationofFederalLaws: A Short History, 79 L. LIBR.
J. 469, 470-71 (1987) (describing early American practice of sending bills to newspapers for
publication, under the Records Act of 1789).
21 See, e.g., 1 U.S.C. § 112 (2018); id. at 471-72.
29 See G.R. Elton, The Rolls ofParliament,1449 1547, 22 HIST. J. 1, 4 (1979).
21

2020]

COPYRIGHT IN THE TEXTS OF THE LAW

Yet, multiple times throughout history, governments have recognized the
value of preparing organized compilations or revisions of the extant statutes.30 These
are called "codes," after the most famous historical compilation, the Roman Codex
of Justinian 1.31 Today, the United States Code is a familiar official code of law

produced by the United States government, 32 and every state maintains a code or
compilation of its laws as well. 33 Many of the states do not have in-house publishing
resources, and so they outsource the printing and even preparation of their codes;
increasingly as well, print versions are being dropped for online-only access to
official legal codes.34
The public-private partnership for publication of state legal codes is largely
responsible for provoking questions of copyright in those codes. 35 Because the
private publishers seek to make profits from their partnerships with the states, they
receive indirect value if copyright exclusivities inhere in the official codes that they
prepare.36 Unsurprisingly, those publishers impress upon the states that copyright
protection in at least some aspect of their official legal codes is important to
demand.37

30

See, e.g., Wienczyslaw J. Wagner, Codification of Law in Europe and the Codification

Movement in the Middle of the Nineteenth Century in the United States, 2 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 335,
340-55 (1953) (describing codification efforts in Europe and the United States).
31

See CODEX JUSTIANIANUS (Paulus Krueger ed., Berlin, Weidmannsche Buchhandlung 1877)

(c. A.D. 534). The literal word "codex" refers to nothing more than a bound book.
32 See 1 U.S.C. § 204(a) (2018).
33 See Street & Hansen, supra note 14, at 219 n.82, addendum (2019).
34 See id; Street & Hansen, supra note 14, at 220.
35 The federal government is precluded from asserting copyright in this manner because by the
terms of the Copyright Act, no copyright inheres in federal government works. See 17 U.S.C. § 105
(2018).
36 See Street & Hansen, supra note 14, at 221 & n.92 (citing research); Brief for Matthew
Bender & Co., Inc. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 9-13, Georgia v.
Public.Resource.Org, Inc., 139 S. Ct. 2746 (2019) (No. 18-1150). The assumption throughout this
article is that the state is the author and the original copyright recipient, so that benefits from any
copyright inure to the publisher by virtue of contracts with the state. If the publisher or other third
party is the original author of material in the codes, then different questions would arise. See Am.
Soc'y for Testing & Materials v. Public.Resource.Org, Inc., 896 F.3d 437, 440 (D.C. Cir. 2018)
(considering "whether private organizations whose standards have been incorporated by reference
can invoke copyright and trademark law to prevent the unauthorized copying and distribution of
their works").
37 See Brief for Arkansas et al, supra note 9, at 20.
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B. The Public.Resource.Org Litigation
On the other side of this debate over copyright in state legal materials is Carl
Malamud, the self-described "rogue archivist" who operates the organization
Public.Resource.Org ("Public Resource") that is dedicated to "making the laws
easier to use and read" for the public.38 In 2013, Public Resource scanned and
uploaded to its website the entirety of the Official Code of Georgia Annotated,
thereby triggering a series of cease-and-desist letters and ultimately a federal
copyright lawsuit from the State of Georgia in 2015.31
Before the district court, Public Resource argued that its copying and
distribution of the official Georgia code were permissible, either because the code

as an edict of government was not amenable to copyright protection, or because
Public Resource's copying and distribution constituted permissible fair use of a
copyrighted work. 40 The district court rejected both arguments and found Public
Resource's acts to be infringing. 41 Regarding copyrightability, the district court

recognized that government edicts were not subject to copyright protection, but
following guidance of the U.S. Copyright Office, the court held that annotations to
an official code were distinguishable and thus copyrightable.42 Turning to fair use,
the court found that Public Resource, though a nonprofit organization, nevertheless
"profits" from grants, donations, and public recognition; 43 in combination with the

fact that the whole work was copied and the effect on Georgia's market for the work
was substantial, the district court found no fair use.44

38

Michael Hiltzik, Georgia Claims that Publishing its State Laws for Free Online is

'Terrorism',L.A. TIMES (July 27, 2015, 12:31 PM), https://www.latimes.com/business/hiltzik/lafi-mh-state-of-georgia-copyright-wall-20150727-column.html;
Adam Liptak, Accused of
'Terrorism' for Putting Legal Materials Online, N.Y. TIMES (May 13, 2019),
https ://www. nytimes. com/2019/05/13/us/politics/georgia-official-code-copyright.html.
39 See Code Revision Comm'n ex rel. Gen. Assembly of Ga. v. Public.Resource.Org, Inc.
(Code Revision Comm ' II), 906 F.3d 1229, 1235 (11 th Cir. 2018).
40 See Code Revision Comm'n v. Public.Resource.Org, Inc. (Code Revision Comm 'n 1), 244
F.Supp. 3d 1350, 1355 (N.D. Ga. 2017), rev'd, Code Revision Comm 'i1, 906 F.3d 1229.
41
See id. at 1361.
4 2 See
id. at 1356 (quoting U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, COMPENDIUM OF U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE
PRACTICES §§ 313.6(C)(2), 717.1 (3d ed. 2014)).
43 See id. at 1359. Before the Eleventh Circuit, the author noted in an amicus brief that this
argument of the district court was plainly inconsistent with the law. See Brief for Public
Knowledge et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellant at 16-23, Code Revision Comm 'n II, 906
F.3d 1229 (11th Cir. 2018) (No. 17-11589).
44 See Code Revision Comm 'n I, 244 F. Supp. 3d at 1360-61.
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On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court on the
copyrightability issue and thereby did not address fair use. 45 Recognizing that the
Ccquestion is a close one," the Court of Appeals recognized the need for a test for
whether a state-authored work is subject to copyright and identified three relevant
factors: "the identity of the public officials who created the work, the
46
authoritativeness of the work, and the process by which the work was created.
Applying those factors, the court held that the official Georgia code was "sufficiently
law-like so as to be properly regarded as a sovereign work," in total including the
annotations. 47 As a result, the court concluded that "the People are the ultimate
authors of the annotations," and so "the annotations are inherently public domain
material and therefore uncopyrightable.
The State of Georgia petitioned for certiorari in March 2019. 49 Unusually,
Public Resource acquiesced in the petition, agreeing that the "Court's review is
warranted" because the precedents and doctrine are "difficult to apply when a work
does not fall neatly into a category, like statutes or judicial opinions, already held to
be edicts."50 The Supreme Court granted the petition for a writ of certiorari on June
24, 2019.51
II
OFFICIAL ANNOTATIONS HAVE LONG BEEN EDICTS OF GOVERNMENT AND
INTEGRAL PARTS OF THE LAW

In assessing how history can inform the Public Resource litigation and the
question of copyright in legal texts generally, the initial observation must be that
state-authored but nonbinding legal materials, such as official statutory annotations,
are far from unusual. History is replete with sovereigns propounding annotated
codes, official commentaries, and other nonbinding pronouncements, and
consideration of these historical examples is instructive not just on the disposition
of the Code Revision Commission case, but also on basic theories of liberty and
government. 2 This section endeavors to present several examples of these historical
45
46

See Code Revision Comm'n II, 906 F.3d at 1233.

Id.at 1232-33.
47 Id. at 1233.
48 Id
49

See Petition for Writ of Certiorari for Plaintiffs-Appellees, Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org,

Inc., 139 S.Ct. 2746 (2019) (No. 18-1150).
50 Brief in Opposition of the Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 9, Public.Resource.Org,Inc., 139
S. Ct. 2746 (2019) (No. 18-1150).
51 See Public.Resource.Org,Inc., 139 S.Ct. 2746 (2019) (No. 18-1150).
52 See generally infra Section III.
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legal texts and the motivations behind them, reactions to them, and consequences of
them, to assist in answering the copyright question.53
A. Rome: Official Commentaries Were Jus Scriptafrom the Republic Through
Justinian
The Roman Republic and Empire repeatedly treated official though
nonbinding commentaries as a component of the law, and valued promulgation of
both.54 As early as 450 B.C., the Roman Republic publicized the famed Law of the
Twelve Tables, inscribed in bronze and posted in the public square, thereby quelling
a threatened class war arising from "the complaint on the part of the plebs, that the
law was an affair of mystery. 55 In 304 B.C., a court clerk named Gnaeus Flavius
became a local hero by leaking the Roman pontiffs' secret interpretations of the
Twelve Tables, winning him high political offices.56
Emphasis on publicizing law developed into the Roman concept ofjus scripta,
57
written law that held a place higher than unwritten, customary law,jus non scripta.

For an article on legal history, a few notes on conventions are in order. Spelling and
capitalization have been modernized in quotations from historical sources, without notation, to
simplify readability. Chinese transliterations have been canonicalized to Pinyin, andj is used rather
than the consonantal i (e.g., jus rather than ius). No changes have been made to titles of works to
facilitate locating them in catalogs, though historical abbreviations of personal names are
expanded, and titles of Roman treatises are abbreviated according to Bluebook conventions. Page
number
citations to Roman law and histories
follow the
classical
format
[book]. [section]. [sentence]
throughout. Because Locke's Essay Concerning Human
Understandingis also organized into books and sections, the same format is followed for it. For
each of these specially-paginated historical works, a specific translation or reprint is referenced;
the volume and page numbers also given with the citations are indexed to that translation or reprint.
Finally, to ensure maximum accessibility of the historical works in this Article, public domain
editions have been cited wherever possible.
54 For an overview of Roman publication of law, see generally Dingledy 2019, supra note 19,
at 172-79.
55 FREDERICK PARKER WALTON, HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION TO THE ROMAN LAW, at 82-89
(Edinburgh W. Green & Sons, 1903); see 2 LIvY WITH AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION IN FOURTEEN
VOLUMES, 3.33-.34, 3.57.10, at 109-13, 195 (B.O. Foster trans., Harvard Univ. Press 1922) (c. 27
B.C.).
56 See 4 LIVY WITH AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION IN FOURTEEN VOLUMES, 9.46.5, at 351 (B.O.
Foster trans., Harvard Univ. Press 1926) (c. 27 B.C.); THE DIGEST OF JUSTINIAN 1.2.2.7, at 8
(Charles Henry Monro trans., 1904) (c. A.D. 533).
57 See THE INSTITUTES OF JUSTINIAN 1.2.10, at 6 (J.B. Moyle trans., 5th ed., Clarendon Press
1913) (c. A.D. 533) (comparing this division to Athenian and Lacedaemonian practice that
"observed only what they had made permanent in written statutes").
53
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Jus scripta was not limited only to statutes, though. 8 Among other things, it
encompassed the Senate's opinions, senatus consulta, which at least during the
Republic were treated as nonbinding commentary on statutes: "It could not annul a
lex.... It could, however, interpret enactments of the popular assembly."59
Nevertheless, senatus consulta weighed heavily on judges, and magistrates ignored
them at their peril.6 °
Roman written law also incorporated private legal scholars' opinions, in the
form of responses to questions of law called responsaprudentium .6 1 Even here the
imperial imprimatur was important. Roman scholars were free to opine on cases to
judges, but starting with Augustus, the emperors conferred jus respondendi upon
select scholars, such that their answers were "in pursuance of an authorization" and
thus effectively binding precedent.62 Multiplication of unofficial commentaries
prompted Valentinian III in A.D. 426 to issue the Law of Citations, designating
several prominent jurists as official-but not binding, for when the jurists "were all
ranged on one side and an imperial rescript was on the other, the latter would
prevail. 63
The apex of symbiosis between private commentary and imperial power was

64
Justinian I's law of A.D. 529-534, modernly called the Corpus Juris Civilis.

Though often called a "code," the Corpus was more than just the Codex. Concerned
See GAiUS, INSTITUTES OF ROMAN LAW 1.2, at 1 (Edward Poste trans., 4th ed., Clarendon
Press 1904) (c. A.D. 161).
58

59 FRAN

FROST ABBOTT, A HISTORY AND DESCRIPTION OF ROMAN POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS 233
(3d ed., Harvard Univ. Press 1911); see id. 1.4, at 2; 3 POLYBIUS, THE HISTORIES 6.16.2, at 30507 (W.R. Paton trans., Harvard Univ. Press 1972) (c. A.D. 150). By the time of the Empire, senatus
consulta were considered statutes, owing to the decline of the comitia representing the people. See
id. 1.4, at 2; THE INSTITUTES OF JUSTINIAN, supra note 57, 1.2.5, at 5.
60
See ROBERT C. BYRD, THE SENATE OF THE ROMAN REPUBLIC: ADDRESSES ON THE HISTORY
OF ROMAN CONSTITUTIONALISM 44 (1995); A. Arthur Schiller, Senatus Consulta in the Principate,
33 Tul. L. Rev. 491, 492 (1959).
61 See GAiUS, INSTITUTES OF ROMAN LAW, supra note 58, 1.7, at 2.
62 THE DIGEST OF JUSTINIAN, supra note 56, 1.2.2.49, at 18; see JOHN CHIPMAN GRAY, THE
NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE LAW sec. 426, at 190 (Columbia Univ. Press 1909); Kaius Tuori,
The Jus Respondendi and the Freedom of Roman Jurisprudence,51 REvuE INTERNATIONALE DES
DROITS L'ANTIQUITE (3E SERIE) 295, 297 (2004). There appears to be some debate as to the
reliability of evidence for thejus respondendi and its effect. Some scholars treat it as a license to
opine on law, such that others may not issue responsaat all; the latter view appears fairly weak.
63

ALAN WATSON, SOURCES OF LAW, LEGAL CHANGE, AND AMBIGUITY 8-9 (Univ. of Pa.

1984); CODEX THEODOSIANUS 1.4, at 19-20 (Paulus Krueger ed., Weidmannsche Buchhandlung
1923) (c. A.D. 426).
64 Frederick W. Dingledy, The CorpusJuris Civiis: A Guide to Its History and Use, 35 LEGAL
REFERENCE SERVICES Q. 231 (2016).

N.Y.U. JOURNAL OF INTELL. PROP. & ENT. LAW

203

[Vol. 9:2

as Valentinian was with the proliferation of private commentaries, Justinian formed
a Law Commission (not unlike Georgia's Code Revision Commission that prepared
its official code 65) to abridge the commentaries. 66 The resulting Digest was, in effect,
an official annotation to the Codex, and yet the Digest received no lesser treatment
as a component of Justinian's law.67
The senatus consulta, jus respondendi, and Digest reflect a consistent
inclusion of nonbinding annotations and commentaries as a critical part of the
complete body of law in Rome. Any distinction between statutes and annotations is
difficult to reconcile with this important precedent to American government.
B. Dynastic China: Official Annotations LiterallyIntertwined with Statutory Law
Like Rome, historical China treated official annotations as integral
components of the law, meriting promulgation to the same extent as statutes. 68
China has favored promulgation of law since at least the Legalist-Confucian
debate spanning the late Spring and Autumn Period, 591-453 B.C. 69 The Legalist
(/ajia)school preferred efficient, predictable government under published laws. 7 0 By
contrast, the Confucians eschewed written law in favor of li, or virtue, theorizing
that written laws would encourage mere compliance rather than moral perfection,
and preferring the discretion over punishment that li offered rulers.1
The Legalists prevailed as early as 536 B.C., when the kingdom of Zheng
publicly displayed its penal text (xing shu), cast onto three-legged vessels.72 A
neighboring leader criticized this publication, saying, "When the people know what

See Code Revision Comm'n ex rel. Gen. Assembly of Ga. v. Public.Resource.Org, Inc., 906
F.3d 1229, 1234 (11th Cir. 2018).
66 See Dingledy, supra note 64, at 234-36.
67 See On the Confirmation of the Digest (Constitutio Tanta), in 1 THE DIGEST OF JUSTINIAN,
supra note 56, at xxv, §§ 19, 21, at xxxiv (prohibiting use or creation of other commentaries, other
than translations to Greek or "paratitla"); Giuseppe Falcone, The Prohibitionof Commentaries to
the Digestand the AntecessorialLiterature,in 9 SUBSECIVA GRONINGANA 1, 5-6 (2014).
68 For an overview of the history of Chinese legal codes, see generally John W. Head &
Yanping Wang, Law Codes in Dynastic China: A Synopsis of Chinese History in the Thirty
Centuries from Zhou to Qing (Carolina Academic Press 2005).
69 See
id. at 48-57.
70 See Liang Zhiping, Explicating "Law": A Comparative Perspective of Chinese and Western
Legal Culture, 3 J. CHINESEL. 55, 80-84 (1989).
71 See HEAD & WANG, supra note 68, at 49 (2005).
72 See Ernest Caldwell, Social Change and Written Law in Early Chinese Legal Thought, 32
L. & HIST. REV. 1, 14-15 (2014).
65
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the exact laws are, they do not stand in awe of their superiors. ' 73 Indeed, Confucius
himself is apocryphally said to have lamented, "People will study the tripods, and
74
not care to know their men of rank.
Nevertheless, the Chinese would publish legal codes for millennia, complete
with official but nonbinding commentary]5 The Han dynasty code of about 200 B.C.
supposedly included decisions from prior dynasties (ko) and "comparisons" (bi) to
be used as precedent; these had less binding power than the statutes but nevertheless
were included in the code.7 6 The Tang code of A.D. 653 also included extensive
77
commentaries; indeed its original title was "The Code and the Subcommentary. It
is "probable that the commentary was an integral part" of the code, omission of
which "would have deprived the unsuspecting reader of a great deal of necessary
information, as well as of explanations without which the meaning and intent of the
articles [i.e., statutes] could not properly be understood. '78
Nonbinding annotations to the law were especially prominent in the Ming
dynasty code of 1585, which would evolve into the Qing dynasty code of 1740. 79 In
addition to the statutes (li), the codes contained "sub-statutes" (i), which literally
translates to "principle, pattern, norm, or example," and which contained
descriptions of precedents often arising out of imperial edicts explaining I/f.8 0 The
sub-statutes were widely recognized not to be statutes, but nevertheless carried such
interpretive force that they might effectively nullify the original intent of the
statute.81 The Qing code also included commentaries on the statutes (but not the substatutes), some official and some private; the official commentaries were considered

The Ch 'un Ts 'ew [Chunqiu]; with the Tso Chuen [Zuozhuan], in 5 JAMES LEGGE, THE
CHINESE CLASSICS 609 (London, Trubner & Co. 1872).
74 HEAD & WANG, supra note 68, at 53. Commentators have questioned the reliability of these
Confucian claims. See Herrlee Glessner Creel, LegalInstitutions andProceduresDuring the Chou
Dynasty, in ESSAYS ON CHINA'S LEGAL TRADITION 26, 37-40 (Jerome Alan Cohen et al. eds.,
1980), quotedwith approvalin HEAD & WANG, supra note 68, at 55-56.
75 See HEAD & WANG, supra note 68, at 93-96, 125, 210.
76 See id. at 93-96; Xin Ren, Tradition of the Law and Law of the Tradition: Law, State, and
Social Control in China 23 (Univ. of Pa. 1997).
77 Wallace Johnson, Introduction to THE T'ANG CODE 3, 39, 43 (Wallace Johnson trans.,
Princeton Univ. Press 1979) (c. A.D. 653).
78 Id. at 43; HEAD & WANG, supra note 68, at 125.
73

See DERK BODDE & CLARENCE MORRIS, LAW IN IMPERIAL CHINA EXEMPLIFIED BY 190
CH'ING DYNASTY CASES 57, 65-66 (Harvard Univ. Press 1967).
79

'o See id. at 64-65.
" See id. at 67.
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so integral to the statutes that they were often written in small print literally in
82
between the lines of the statutory text.
Three millennia of Chinese history reveal a commitment to government
promulgation of the law, both statutes and official annotations. The Han through
Qing codes are thus strong markers of the close ties between official annotations and
law.
C. England, 1485 1490: Nonbinding "Englished"Law Secures the Crown's
Authority
Throughout the history of England, official but nonbinding pronouncements

have been a critical component of the law, even from the first days of printed matter.
While there is much to be gleaned from the formative years of the
parliamentary statute in medieval English times,83 this article begins with the critical
moment of the introduction of printing to England at the end of the 15th century.
The evidence from this time demonstrates that nonbinding legal texts were an
integral part of the law worthy of public promulgation no less than statutes.
At the onset of printing in the late 15th century, the official language of
English law was not English. Statutes were titled in Latin and officially written in
so-called "law French," as exemplified by William de Machlinia's 1484 printing of
Richard III's statutes. 4 When Henry VII took the throne in 1485, Parliament also

82

83

See id.at 69; HEAD & WANG, supra note 68, at 210 box VI-3.
It was during this time that the concept of statutory legislation, and indeed the word "statute"

itself, came into being. See H.G. Richardson & George Sayles, The Early Statutes, PartI,50 L.Q.
REv. 201, 202-03 (1934). One primary lesson from medieval English law is that the law is not the
same as enacted statutes: an unenacted royal writ directed to a specific person could come to be a
statute of general applicability by popular acclaim, for example. See David K. Millon,
CircumspecteAgatis Revisited, 2 L. & HIST. REv. 105, 107-08 & n.7 (1984). Conversely, statutes
enacted by Parliament were seen as "affirmances of the ancient law"-essentially commentaries
on the common law-resulting in the courts occasionally disregarding statutes that they found to
be in conflict with the common law. See Thomas Bonham v. Coll. of Physicians (Dr. Bonham's
Case), 77 Eng. Rep. 638 (C.P. 1610) (Coke, C.J.) (describing medieval cases rejecting statutes in
this manner).
84 See Introduction to THE STATUTES OF THE REALM, at xxi, xl (London, Dawsons 1810),
[hereinafter Introduction]; Katharine F. Pantzer, Printingthe English Statutes, 1484 1640: Some
HistoricalImplications, in BOOKS AND SOCIETY IN HISTORY 69, 71-73 (Kenneth E. Carpenter ed.,
1983).
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produced statutes, again officially in law French.85 Yet when around 1490 the Crown
6
commissioned William Caxton to print the statutes, Caxton did so in English.1
No doubt the lawyers of the time would have understood Caxton's
translations, although as emanations of the king, not as law. The prevailing view was
that law could be "express[ed] more aptly in French than in English" owing to the
many technical terms of law French. An English translation would have been
considered not merely unofficial but indeed ambiguous.
Yet England made and promulgated these nonbinding explanations of the
law-at no cost to English subjects-because doing so served important purposes.
By informing the public on the law, the Crown hoped to instill virtue in its subjectsand, selfishly, to propagandize its own majesty and justness.8 That required the law
to be not just public, but understandable to the average English subject. Not long
after Caxton's publication, lawyer and printer John Rastell would deem Henry VII
"worthy to be called the second Solomon" by virtue of having the statutes "written
in the vulgar English tongue and to be published, declared, and imprinted so that
then universally the people of the realm might soon have the knowledge of the said
statutes."89

Perhaps a state legal code is not so arcane as law French, but the terseness of
statutes can make them opaque absent interpretive aids. Official annotations offer a
window into the legislator's reasoning just as "Englishing" of statutes did in the 15th
century. Neither can be disregarded as part of the law.

85

86

See Introduction, supra note 84, at xli; Pantzer, supra note 84, at 74.
See Introduction, supra note 84, at xli; Pantzer, supra note 84, at 74-75; THE STATUTES OF

VII (John Rae ed., London, John Camden Hotten 1869) (c. 1489). Pantzer puts the date of
Caxton's publication at 1490, but the facsimile copy dates it to 1489.
87 JOHN FORTESCUE, DE LAUDIBUS LEGUM ANGLLE, translated in COMMENDATION OF THE
LAWS OF ENGLAND 80 (Francis Grigor trans., Sweet & Maxwell 1917) (c. 1468-1471); see 2 W. S.
HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW, at 481 (3d ed. 1923) ("French continued to be the
language of the law because the technical terms were nearly all French.").
HENRY

88

See Pantzer, supra note 84, at 73-75; David J. Harvey, THE LAW EMPRYNTED AND

ENGLYS SHED: THE PRINTING PRESS AS AN AGENT OF CHANGE IN LAW AND LEGAL CULTURE 1475-

1642, at 24 (Hart Publ'g 2015).
89

John Rastell, Prohemium to THE ABBREVIATION OF THE STATUTES (1519), reprintedin 1
327, 328-29 (Joseph Ames & William Herbert eds., London, Soc'y

TYPOGRAPHICAL ANTIQUITIES

of Antiquaries 1785) (spelling modernized, see supra note 53). The various editions of
TypographicalAntiquitiesgive different titles and dates for Rastell's work; the original appears to
be lost.
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To be sure, England did not allow for unrestricted access to the law.90
Authority to print the statutes and other official documents was (and technically still
is) closely held by royal prerogative and monopolized by the King's or Queen's
Printer;91 the printing of case reports and other common law texts was also
monopolized under a patent for printing the common law.92 But these elements of
what today is called "Crown copyright" should provide little solace to states who
assert the monopoly of copyright in their legal texts: along with the general printing
monopoly of the Stationers' Guild and the Star Chamber decrees of 1586 and 1637,
the prerogative and patent were elements of the English government's
comprehensive scheme to censor information and dominate the press out of fear of
inciting in England the religious unrest of the Protestant Reformation.2 American
states presumably do not justify their copyright claims upon religious censorship.
D. England, 1520 1640: PromulgatedExplanations of Law CounteractAbsolutist
Monarchy
The printing press sparked a debate over the propriety of printing the law, a
debate that reveals grave risks in restricting access to official but nonbinding edicts
94
of government.
The "publicists" supported printing the law of England, particularly in
English, to improve social morals.95 Lawyer-printer John Rastell, in praising the
English translation of Henry VII's statutes (and in printing his own translation of
older statutes into that "vulgar tongue"), explained in 1519 that "knowledge of the

90

See JOSEPH CHITTY, JR., A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF THE PREROGATIVES OF THE CROWN;

238-41 (London, Joseph Butterworth &
Son 1820) (describing "prerogative copyright" of the Crown).
91 See MINISTRY OF JUSTICE,REVIEW OF THE EXECUTIVE ROYAL PREROGATIVE POWERS: FINAL
REPORT 32 (2009).
92 See H.J. Byrom, Richard Tottell His Life and Work, 8 LIBR. 4TH 199, 223-25 (1927)
(describing a dispute over whether abridgments of statutes fell under the jurisdiction of the
Queen's Printer or under the common law printing patent).
93 See Richard J. Ross, The Commoning of the Common Law: The Renaissance Debate over
PrintingEnglish Law, 1520 1640, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 323, 338-39, 417 n.269 (1998); see also An
Act for Abolishing of Diversity of Opinions in Certain Articles Concerning Christian Religion
1539, 31 Hen. 8 c. 14.
94 See Ross, supra note 93, at 326-27.
95 See id. at 329-42; Howard Jay Graham, "Our Tong Maternall Maruellously Amendyd and
Augmentyd": The First Englishing and Printing of the Medieval Statutes at Large, 1530-1533, 13
UCLAL. REV. 58, 70-72 (1965).
AND THE RELATIVE DUTIES AND RIGHTS OF THE SUBJECT
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said statutes" would Lord
allowBrooke,
people after
"better
to live
in tranquility
peace."96
7 wrote:
Politician-turned-poet
alluding
to Gnaeus
Flavius, 9and
Again, laws ordered must be, and set down
So clearly as each man may understand,
Wherein for him, and wherein for the crown,
Their rigor or equality doth stand ....

1

Opponents of the publicists were primarily lawyers who stood to lose their
monopoly over knowledge of the law. 9 The arguments of these "anti-publicists"
illuminate why access to the law ought to encompass official annotations.
The anti-publicists generally did not oppose publishing binding law,
protesting instead publication of the reasoning behind the law.1 00It is "assuredly no
matter of necessity to publish the reasons of the judgment of the law, or apices [fine
points] orfictionesjuristo the multitude," wrote one lawyer. 10 1 Like the Confucians,
the anti-publicists feared that "the unlearned by bare reading" of the law without the
training of the Inns of Court "might suck out errors" and thus "endamage
themselves.

' 10 2 Worse

yet, miscreants could use knowledge of law as "shifts to cloak

their wickedness, rather than to gain understanding." ' 103 More selfishly, the antipublicists feared that publicizing the law would deny the bar the ability to
characterize and evolve the law through in-guild decisions and manuscript-exchange
104
norms that controlled the development of precedents.
But the most important-and insidious-objection to law printing was one
"married uneasily" to a larger debate over absolutist monarchy. 105 Presaging
Rastell, supra note 89, at 329 (spelling modernized).
97 See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
16

Poems ofMonarchy, in THE WORKS IN VERSE AND PROSE COMPLETE 5,
101 (New York, AMS Press 1966) (1870) (spelling modernized).
99 See Ross, supra note 93, at 390.
100 See id. at 354-55.
101 William Hudson, A Treatise on the Court of Star-Chamber,in 2 COLLECTANEA JURIDICA,
98 1 FuLKE GREVILLE,

CONSISTING OF TRACTS RELATIVE TO THE LAW AND CONSTITUTION OF ENGLAND 1, 1-2 (Francis

Hargrave ed., London, W. Clarke & Sons 1792) (spelling modernized); see Ross, supra note 93,
at 358.
102 2 EDWARD COKE, To the Reader, in THE REPORTS OF SIR EDWARD COKE iii, xxxix-xl
(London, J. Butterworth & Son 1826) (c. 1600); see Ross, supra note 93, at 374-75.
103 Hudson, supra note 101, at 2; Ross, supra note 93, at 376.
104 See Ross, supra note 93, at 432-38 (reviewing the bar's use of manuscript copying policies
and marginal notes, which "inculcated conventions of reading ... that guided the amendment of
texts").
105 Id. at 452.
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Georgia's view of its official code as the state's intellectual property, many antipublicists supposed that because the Crown was the sole fount of power, the law was
its "property"; as such there was no more need for the monarch to explain a law than
for a parent to explain punishing a child. 106
Few would accept absolutism today; the contrary view that law binds the
sovereign is foundational to American government. And insofar as absolutism is
rejected, one ought also to reject the anti-publicists'-and Georgia's-corollary
view that sovereign explanations of the law do not implicate access concerns.
E. England, 1640 1642: Printingof ParliamentaryDebates PlantsSeeds of
Democracy
The publishing of English parliamentary debates in the mid-1600s
demonstrates how access to nonbinding but official materials, in this case legislative
history, fosters popular sovereignty and public representation.
Parliament, even today, nominally holds the power to render its debates secret
and to punish those who publish its proceedings. 10 7 The parliamentary privilege of
"freedom of speech" provides that "Debates or Proceedings in Parlyament [sic]
ought not to be impeached or questioned in any Court or Place out of Parlyament
[sic]."108 The Houses of Parliament interpreted this liberty to entail a copyright-like
power to prohibit anyone-even their own members-from publishing debates. 109
Certainly, privilege was enforceable only by contempt, as the common law
courts refused to apply and indeed disparaged the secrecy privilege.' 10 But contempt
106 Id.

at 455; see 11 JAMES USSHER, The Power Communicated by God to the Prince, in THE

D.D. 223, 349 (Charles Richard Elrington ed.,
Dublin, Hodges, Smith, & Co. 1864) ("And who seeth not what confusion would be brought, as

WHOLE WORKS OF THE MOST REV. JAMES USSHER,

well into a family as a state, if a son or a servant, or a subject might have liberty to stand upon
terms and chop logic with his father master, or prince, and refuse to yield obedience to their
commands, until he should see some reason for it?").
107 See Clive Parry, Legislatures and Secrecy, 67 HARV. L. REV. 737, 741-43 (1954).
Parliamentary privilege differs from Crown copyright discussed above.
108 Bill of Rights, 1 W. & M. sess. 2, c. 2 (1689), 6 THE STATUTES OF THE REALM 143 (Eng.)
(London, Dawsons 1819).
109 See Wason v. Walter, [1868] 38 Eng. Rep. 34, 45 (QB); Carl Wittke, The History ofEnglish
ParliamentaryPrivilege,26 OHIO ST. U. BULL. 2, 50-51 (1921); H. Tomis G6mez-Arostegui, The
Untold Story of the First CopyrightSuit Under the Statute of Anne in 1710, 25 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 1247, 1252-53 (2010).
110 See, e.g., Wason, 38 Eng. Rep. at 45; The King v. Wright, [1799] 101 Eng. Rep. 1396, 1399
(KB) ("it is of advantage to the public, and even to the legislative bodies, that true accounts of their
proceedings should be generally circulated").

COPYRIGHT IN THE TEXTS OF THE LAW

2020]

210

punishments could be severe.ill In 1581, the House of Commons charged its member
Arthur Hall with "publishing the conferences of this House abroad in print," and
sentenced him with expulsion, a fine of 500 marks (about $130,000 today), and six
112
months' imprisonment in the Tower.
Nevertheless, a healthy industry of printing parliamentary debates began
during the Long Parliament of 1640.113 Disregard of the privilege was flagrant:
Members not only published their speeches but occasionally registered them with
the Company of Stationers. 114 Apart from sanctions against Sir Edward Dering for
publishing not just speeches but also private conversations of Parliament,
115
parliamentary privilege was essentially unenforced during this period.
It was a good thing, too, that printing of debates flourished through the Long
Parliament, because promulgation of those debates arguably catalyzed modem
participatory democracy. Prior to 1640, the average English subject petitioned
Parliament not for public policy change but with private grievances. 116 With the
publication of parliamentary debates, an informed public could understand and thus
engage in the political process: "[p]olitical discourse in printed texts encouraged
readers to interpret conflict between King and Parliament, and subsequently among
parliamentary factions, as an ongoing debate."'1 17 In particular, printed political
debates allowed for a new form of petitioning Parliament, in which proponents of
change could stir up support by presenting and critiquing the speeches of
members.118

111 See THOMAS ERSKINE MAY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW, PRIVILEGES, PROCEEDINGS AND

88-92 (10th ed., London, William
unlimited fines and imprisonment as possible punishments).
112 1 H.C. JOuR. 125, 127 (1802) (Eng.) (resolution and
this was not Commons' only charge against Hall, and
particularly salacious. On the present-value computation,
USAGE OF PARLIAMENT

Determining

Historical

Monetary

Values,

Clowes & Sons, Ltd. 1893) (noting
order of Feb. 14, 1581). To be sure,
Hall's publication was apparently
see Eric W. Nye, A Method for

https://www.uwyo.edu/numimage/currency

conversion.htm (last visited Mar. 27, 2020).
E.g., SPEECHES AND PASSAGES OF THIS GREAT AND HAPPY PARLIAMENT: FROM THE THIRD
OF NOVEMBER, 1640, TO THIS INSTANT JUNE, 1641 (London, William Cooke 1641); A.D.T.
Cromartie, The PrintingofParliamentarySpeeches November 1640 July 1642, 33 HIST. J. 23, 23
113

(1990).
114
115
116

See Cromartie, supra note 113, at 35.
See id. at 37.
See David Zaret, Petitionsandthe "Invention" ofPublic Opinion in the EnglishRevolution,

101 AM. J. Soc. 1497, 1509-10 (1996).
117 Id.at 1530.
118 See id. at 1532.
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Printing parliamentary debates thus gave rise to "public opinion" as a political
force. Public opinion, in turn, gave way to notions of popular sovereignty, including
' and Madison's "all governments rest on opinion. 120
Locke's "law of opinion"119
Publication of nonbinding, official pronouncements of the legislature thus
engendered this fundamental principle of American government.
F. Great Britain and New York, 1762 1796: Suppression of Debate Printing
Sparks Demandfor Freedom of Speech
Debate printing in the next century had a starker impact on America: it
instigated freedom of the press.
When English newspapers began printing parliamentary debates in the mid1700s, the House of Commons remarkably did exercise its parliamentary
privilege. 121 In January 1762, Commons imprisoned the printer of the London
Chronicle for printing a speech of the Speaker, deterring further printing of debates
122
for several years.
The 1768 Middlesex election affair reinvigorated debate reporting, and
Parliament again tried to block it.123 In what came to be called the Printers' Case of
1771, the House of Commons, led by its member Colonel George Oslow, summoned
124
eight newspaper printers for contempt of privilege by printing debates. Most
confessed and made contrition on their knees, but John Miller, publisher of the
London EveningPost, refused to appear. 125 Commons sent for Miller's arrest but was
thwarted by Brass Crosby, Lord Mayor of London, who asserted sole jurisdiction
for arrests in his city. 126 In an infamous move that triggered days of protests, the

119 1

JOHN LOCKE, AN ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING 2.28.10-.12,

at 476-77

(Alexander Campbell Fraser ed., Oxford, Clarendon Press 1894) (c. 1689).
120 THE FEDERALIST No. 49 (James Madison); see Zaret, supra note 116, at 1540; Elisabeth
Noelle-Neumann, Public Opinion and the ClassicalTradition:A Re-Evaluation, 43 PUB. OPINION
Q. 143, 144-46 (1979).

See Thomas, supra note 2, at 623.
122 See id. at 624.
123 See id.
124 See 17 PARE. HIST. ENG., supra note 5, at 59-62. That treatise was originally titled Cobbett's
121

ParliamentaryHistory after its proprietor William Cobbett, but in 1810 Cobbett was imprisoned
for criticizing the government's military discipline. See J.C. TREWIN & E.M. KING, PRINTER TO
THE HOUSE: THE STORY OF HANSARD 94-101 (Methuen 1952).
125 See 17 PARL. HIST. ENG., supra note 5, at 85-90.
126
See id. at 98, 101.
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House of Commons, frustrated with Crosby for protecting Miller, threw the Lord
127
Mayor into the Tower instead.
It is easy to imagine how parliamentary censorship in 1771 might have
influenced Revolution-era American thinking on liberty and speech. There is
considerable evidence that it did. 128 The Virginia Gazette predicted that "the present
dispute about the liberty of the press will, in all probability, give a mortal wound to
arbitrary power"; 129 a week later it ran an open letter of the pseudonymous English
polemicist Junius, excoriating Parliament's actions. 130 Benjamin Franklin knew of
the incident,131 as did Samuel Adams, who called the affair "a stretch of arbitrary
power. 132 Americans celebrated John Wilkes, the London alderman who helped
orchestrate the showdown between Parliament and the printers,133 for championing
4
freedom of the press. 13
Americans continued to find parliamentary privilege antithetical to their
principles.135 One member of Congress declared that congressional debates were
"offered to the public view, and held up to the inspection of the world.113 6 And when
in 1796, the New York Assembly jailed newspaper writer William Keteltas for "a
127

See id.at 157-58, 186-90; Brass Crosby's Case, [1771] 95 Eng. Rep. 1005 (K.B.) 1005-
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For another historian connecting the Printers' Case to the development of American
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freedom of the press, see JEFFERY A. SMITH, PRINTERS AND PRESS FREEDOM: THE IDEOLOGY OF

23 (Oxford Univ. Press 1988).
See Alex Purdie & John Dixon, London, April 2, VA. GAZETTE, June 13, 1771, at 1, 2.
130 See William Rind, Letter of Junius,from the Public Advertiser, April 22, VA. GAZETTE,
June 20, 1771, at 1.
'11 See Letter from Benjamin Franklin to Joseph Galloway, in 18 THE PAPERS OF BENJAMIN
FRANKLIN 77 (Ellen R. Cohn et al. eds., Yale Univ. Press 1974).
132 See Letter from Samuel Adams to Arthur Lee, in 2 RICHARD HENRY LEE, LIFE OF ARTHUR
LEE, LL. D. 173, 174 (Boston, Wells & Lilly 1829).
133 See Peter D.G. Thomas, John Wilkes and the Freedom of the Press (1771), 33 BULL. INST.
HIST. RES. 86, 88-91 (1960).
134 See Roger P.
Mellen, John Wilkes and the ConstitutionalRight to a FreePressin the United
States, 41 JOURNALISM HIST. 2, 8 (2015). Mellen misattributes several colonial newspaper reports
to Wilkes's earlier printing disputes; in fact those papers were referring to the Printers' Case.
135 See David S. Bogen, The Origins of Freedom of Speech and Press, 42 MD. L. REV. 429,
434-35 (1983). Compare David A. Anderson, The Originsof the Press Clause, 30 UCLAL. REV.
455, 511-12 (1983), with Leonard W. Levy, On the Originsof the Free Press Clause, 32 UCLA
L. REV. 177, 192-94 (1984). Anderson and Levy appear to agree that public opinion about
parliamentary privilege played into views on sedition laws and thus the free speech clause; they
disagree as to the degree to which legislatures themselves asserted the privilege.
136 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 443 (Joseph Gales ed., 1834) (statement of Rep. Jackson on June 8,
1789).
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breach of the privileges" by reporting a debate, among his supporters was "Camillus
13 7
Junius," a pseudonym that surely recalls the 1771 English episode.
There is little daylight between parliamentary privilege and copyright when it
comes to a legislature suppressing publication of nonbinding yet official
pronouncements. In both cases the state levies powerful, even criminal138 remedies

against its citizens for publicizing information crucial for public dialogue. History
has denounced state-asserted privilege as contrary to freedoms of speech and

press;139 state-asserted copyright ought to fare no better.
G. Virginia, 1846 1887: The Commonwealth Annotates Official Codes Despite
FlagrantCopying
Although the states of America have been making legal codes since before
they were states, 140 interest in codification accelerated in the mid-1800s as a result
14 1
of successes of the Napoleonic Code Civil and lobbying by Jeremy Bentham.
Some of the resulting codes were annotated, such as Alabama's 1852 code, for which
the General Assembly directed "a suitable person to make head notes to the titles,
chapters, and articles.1 4 Virginia was one of the first to enact a civil code during
this period,143 and its experience particularly reflects both recognition of the public
value of official annotations and a lack of concern for copyright exclusivity.

137

See ALFRED F. YOUNG, THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLICANS OF NEW YORK: THE ORIGINS 1763-

1797, at 482-87 (Univ. of N.C. Press 1967).
138 See 17 U.S.C. § 506(a) (2018).
139 See supra notes 121-137 and accompanying text.
140 See, e.g., THE LAWS AND LIBERTIES OF MASSACHUSETTS (Max Farrand ed., Harvard Univ.
Press 1929) (1648).
141 See CHARLES WARREN, A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN BAR 512-13 (Little, Brown, and Co.
1911). Other commentators correctly observe that there was not necessarily a "codification
movement" insofar as most of the codification efforts failed, but nevertheless there was a wave of
interest in and debate on the topic of codification. See Robert W. Gordon, Book Review, 36 VAND.
L. REV. 431, 434 (1983) (reviewing CHARLES M. COOK, THE AMERICAN CODIFICATION
MOVEMENT, A STUDY OF ANTEBELLUM LEGAL REFORM (1981)) (inferring that Cook shows "that
a codification movement never really existed").
142 Act to Provide for the Adoption, Printing and Distribution of the Code of Alabama, ch. 9,
§ 1, 1851 ALA. ACTS 22 (Feb. 5, 1852); ALA. CODE 797 (John J. Ormond et al. eds., Montgomery,
Brittan and De Wolf 1852) (noting appointment of Henry C. Semple to this position).
143 See Kent C. Olson, State Codes, in VIRGINIA LAWBOOKS: ESSAYS AND BIBLIOGRAPHIES 1,
5-6 (W. Hamilton Bryson ed., Am. Philosophical Soc'y 2000). Virginia already had a long
tradition of compilations and revisions of its laws. See generally Dingledy 2019, supra note 19,
47-59, at 183-88.
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In 1846, the General Assembly of Virginia appointed a commission "to revise
and digest the civil code of this commonwealth," and in so doing to include "such
notes and explanations as they shall deem essential to a clear understanding of the
same." 144 The revisors, John M. Patton and Conway Robinson, produced five reports
145
over the next few years in response.
The revisors' reports are notable because they contain not just a code of law
but also extensive annotations summarizing and analyzing case law. To head off
criticisms that their revisions would undermine existing case law, Patton and
Robinson presented their proposed code "accompanied by notes referring to
decisions, and giving such explanations as we deemed essential to a clear
understanding of our views. 146 In the section on amending pleadings at trial, for
example, the report contains an extensive annotation laying out the cases and
concluding that the judicial decisions "go to show the propriety of that statute; we
approve the mode in which, under it, justice was administered. ' 147 The revisors'
reports are thus much like a state annotated code, containing both statutes that were
ultimately enacted into law and nonbinding explanatory annotations. 148
Nevertheless, the revisors' annotations were openly copied. 149 In 1856,
attorney James M. Matthews published his Digest of the Laws of Virginia,which not
only copied the text of the statutes but also explicitly reproduced "the very valuable
notes of the Revisors of the Code, contained in their Reports to the Legislature. 150
Among other things, the digest reproduces wholesale the annotation on pleading
151
amendments.
In its amicus brief in the Georgiav. Public.Resource.Org,Inc. case, Virginia
contends that without copyright protection, it might "cease production of an official
144

Act to Provide for the Revisal of the Civil Code of This Commonwealth, ch. 34, § 1, 1845

VA. ACTS 26 (Feb. 20, 1846).
145

JOHN M. PATTON & CONWAY ROBINSON, REPORT OF THE REVISORS OF THE CODE OF

(Richmond, Samuel Shepherd 1847-1849). The reports are unnumbered and bound
inconsistently, so volume numbers are used to identify each of the five reports.
146 1 id. at ix.
147 4 id. ch. 177, § 7, at 873-74 n.*.
VIRGINIA

The enacted code did not contain the explanatory annotations, so they could not be binding
law. See, e.g., VA. CODE ch. 177, § 7, at 672 (1849) (lacking annotation from the revisors' report
noted above). Curiously, other annotations were added to the enacted and published code; their
provenance is unclear. See, e.g., ch. 177, § 4 note, at 671.
148

149

See 1 JAMES M. MATTHEWS, DIGEST OF THE LAWS OF VIRGINIA OF A CIVIL NATURE iv

(Richmond, J.W. Randolph 1856).
150 Id.
151 1 id. ch. 19, § 7, n.5, at 235-36.
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annotated code. 152 Yet the Commonwealth's actions belie its claim. No copyright
suit against Matthews or his publisher appears to exist, despite the legislature's
knowledge of its copyright registration and of the value of its work.153 Indeed, the
Secretary of the Commonwealth, Colonel George W. Munford, appeared to approve
15 4
of Matthews's digest in the preface to Virginia's 1860 code.
To be sure, the lack of litigation may reflect the more limited nature of
copyright law at the time,155 but the important point is that the copyright incentive
was unnecessary. Even without it, Virginia continued undeterred to publish not only
official codes but also annotations. The act authorizing publication of the 1860 code
directed the secretary to include "such notes in each case of repeal, alteration, or
amendment.115 6 Munford did so extensively, providing both well-researched
citations to case law and analysis of legislative history, for example opining on the
supersessional effect of Virginia's 1847 telegraph statutes. 15 7 Virginia's 1887 code
also contained notes and references to cases, for example, on protecting
householders from certain debt collections.158 In their preface to the 1887 code, the
revisors note it was "much desired" to have fuller references within the code;
tellingly, the obstacle to their doing so was not a lack of copyright or compensation,
but excess page length.159
That Virginia produced annotated official codes for decades despite knowing
its annotations were being copied shows that copyright was not a necessary incentive
for state production of annotated codes. The revisors and preparers of those
annotations would no doubt agree. In the prefaces to the 1849, 1860, and 1887
Virginia codes, they all acknowledge "a deep sense of [the] importance" of the
legislature's charge not merely to compile the laws but to provide a "clear
understanding of the same. ' 160 They understood that the task of the state explaining
152
153

Brief for Arkansas et al., supra note 9, at 2.
See Act to Provide for the Publication of the Code of Virginia, ch. 2, §§ 3, 7, 1849 VA.

ACTS 255 (Aug. 16, 1849).
154

George W. Munford, Preface to VA. CODE iii, iii (2d ed., Richmond, Ritchie, Dunnavant &

Co. 1860).

The published revisors' reports appear to lack formalities. Furthermore, there was "painful
uncertainty" on whether abridgments, such as Matthews' digest, were infringing. Story's Ex'rs v.
155

Holcombe, 23 Fed. Cas. 171, 172 (C.C.D. Ohio 1847).
156 Munford, supra note 154, at iii, v.
157 See VA. CODE ch. 65, §30 at 337.
158 VA. CODE ch. 178, §20 at 674 (1887).
159
160

See E.C. Burks et al., Preface to VA. CODE iii, v (1887).
4 PATTON & ROBINSON, supra note 145, at iii-iv; see also Munford, supra note 154, at iv

(compiler acknowledging that "he has felt the responsibility deeply, and no thought or labor has
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the law devolves not from private pecuniary interests but from basic duties of a
sovereign to its citizens.
III
HISTORY COUNSELS A CONSERVATIVE APPROACH TO STATE ASSERTION OF
COPYRIGHT IN LEGAL MATERIALS

History carries multiple insights relevant to disposition of the question of
copyright in state legal texts, namely whether copyright law allows a government to
muzzle access to official state-authored materials, such as annotations to a legal
code. Three such conclusions are discussed below.
A. Edicts of Government, and Law Generally,Are Not Limited to Acts of Binding
Legal Force
First, the law consists not merely of sovereign acts carrying binding force.
Pronouncements of government instead fall on a spectrum of binding power.
Georgia's repeated insistence that edicts of government for this case are limited to
those that "establish any enforceable rights or obligations, 161 then, is inconsistent
with millennia of history.
From the beginning, nonbinding commentaries and annotations have carried
legal weight. 162 The Romans respected the nonbinding advice of the Senate and gave
special weight to commentators having the imprimatur of jus respondendi.163 The
Qing dynasty code visually distinguished official and private commentaries, literally
interweaving the former with the statutory text. 164 Furthermore, the 16th-century
anti-publicists who acquiesced in printing statutes but feared giving the uneducated
masses the "apices or fictiones juris"-points and fictions of legal reasoning that
explained the rules-illustrate the potency of those nonbinding sources of law. 165
The consistent blurring of what constitutes the law is unsurprising, because
the purpose of promulgated law is broader than merely putting citizens on notice of
punishable acts. As the Chinese legalists 166 and English publicists 167 understood, law
been spared in the earnest endeavor to accomplish the task"); Burks et al., supra note 159, at v
("[O]ur utmost endeavor has been to discharge our whole duty faithfully and conscientiously.").
161
162
163
164
165
166
167

Brief for Petitioners, supra note 11, at 3.
See discussion supra notes 54-60 and accompanying text.
See discussion supra notes 62-67 and accompanying text.
See discussion supra notes 68-82 and accompanying text.
See discussion supra notes 100-106 and accompanying text.
See discussion supra notes 69-74 and accompanying text.
See discussion supra notes 95-98 and accompanying text.
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promotes civic virtue and informs people of the will of the sovereign. Promulgated
law enables citizens, apprised of the sovereign's reasoning, to participate in
government and to sway that reasoning based on public opinion, as Parliament
learned from publishing its debates. 168 Promulgated law checks arbitrary government
power, much to the chagrin of the Confucians 169 and Colonel Oslow. 17° Moreover,
promulgated law sets a historical marker of a society's culture, without which a study
such as the present article could not exist.
Nonbinding but official pronouncements of government at issue in this case
serve these purposes equally, if not afortiori.It was announcement of English law
not in its binding law-French form but in the unofficial vulgar tongue that enhanced
the Crown's reputation and advised the people on how to live in "tranquility and
peace. 171 It was the printing of parliamentary debates that spurred public
participation in the legislative process. 172
In particular, nonbinding pronouncements uniquely serve an essential
function of law: statutory interpretation and construction. Both China and Rome
recognized that the statutes alone could not clearly expound the law, so their official
commentaries contained "a great deal of necessary information" for understanding
statutes. 173 And official explanations of law are, in Justice Scalia's words, "ordinarily
the most persuasive" extrinsic information for judicial construction, a theory put into
practice by the Georgia courts that have repeatedly relied on the state's official
annotations. 174
That the full body of law encompasses both binding and nonbinding texts
counsels against discarding any of them from rights of public access in view of
copyright or other laws. History and contemporary practices show that a nonbinding
official pronouncement can play an important role in delineating the rights of
citizens, making it no less a part of "the law," and no less an edict of government,
than a statute.

See discussion supra notes 107-118 and accompanying text.
See discussion supra notes 71-74 and accompanying text.
170 See discussion supra notes 123-127 and accompanying text.
171 See discussion supra notes 83-89 and accompanying text.
172 See discussion supra notes 116-120 and accompanying text.
173 1 Johnson, supra note 77, at 43; see Dingledy, supra note 64, at 235.
174 Tome v. United States, 513 U.S. 150, 167 (1995) (Scalia, J., concurring); see Code Revision
Comm'n ex rel. Gen. Assembly of Ga. v. Public.Resource.Org, Inc., 906 F.3d 1229, 1250-51 (11th
168
169

Cir. 2018).
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B. Control over the Reasons and Explanations of Law Confers Undue Power on
Government and the Legal Profession
History also reveals the danger of allowing states the power to restrain access
to nonbinding legal pronouncements, whether under copyright law or otherwise.
That power can exacerbate both government centralization and undue influence of
the bar.
The arguments of states wishing to wield copyright against their citizens find
176
uneasy company with the ancient Confucians 175 and the English anti-publicists,
who preferred the absolutist sovereign meting out law and punishment while leaving
those without means blind to the reasons. No doubt this regime promotes obedience,
but to contemporary ears it smacks of autocracy. Similarly, should a state such as
Georgia exercise its copyright privilege to deny access to reasoning contained in
official annotations, the state would potentially wield undue power. It could, for
example, selectively conceal its views on whether a statute should be construed
narrowly or broadly, perhaps leading risk-averse citizens to forgo rights or liberties

they otherwise would enjoy. 177
Control over official annotations to law also hands improvident power to the
bar. The anti-publicist English lawyers knew that legal printing stood to cost them
their monopoly over the written reasoning of the law and thus their political power
to shape the direction of legal reform. 178 New York lawyer James Coolidge Carter
similarly led opposition to state codification efforts in the 1850s, again to maintain
the bar's control over evolving the law. 179 State assertion of copyright also places the
official annotations largely in the hands of well-funded lawyers, raising the same
concern that those with the most access to the official, promulgated commentaryand thus the ability to shape it-are a professional class uncharacteristic of the
general public.
C. Unlike Case Reports or Treatises,Annotated Official Codes Are a Traditional
State Dictum
Attempting to avert the strangeness of a state wielding copyright against
citizens, states such as Georgia and their supporters repeatedly analogize to private
175

176
177

See discussion supra notes 71-74 and accompanying text.
See discussion supra notes 100-106 and accompanying text.
Cf Yates v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1074, 1090 (2015) (Alito, J., concurring) (relying in

part on a statute's nonbinding title to narrow construction).
178 See discussion supra note 104 and accompanying text.
179 See Mathias Reimann, The HistoricalSchool against Codification: Savigny, Carter, and
the Defeat of the New York Civil Code, 37 AM. J. COMP. L. 95, 110-13 (1989).
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legal treatises and headnotes to cases, supposing that the state, as annotator of the
official code, is acting less like a government and more like a private scholar. 180
History again disputes this claim, because unlike treatises and case reports, official
annotated codes of law have long been the province of sovereigns.
State-published annotations are a tradition going back centuries.181 Justinian
declared two commentaries, the Digest and Institutes, official components of the
Corpus Juris Civilis alongside the statutes. 18 2 Annotations have been part of the
Chinese legal tradition since at least the 200 B.C. Han dynasty code.183 England did
not develop a tradition of publishing official commentaries on laws until about the
20th century, 18 4 but annotated codes were frequent in Virginia and other states.185
By contrast, neither case reports nor private treatises have traditionally been
promulgations of the state. 18 6 Private treatises on law abounded in Rome, but the
emperors distinguished the unofficial from the official through proclamations and
jus respondendi.18 7 English case reports were also understood to be private works:
the medieval Year Books were unofficial and generally attributed to lawyers or law
students,188 and the nominate reports that followed identified the names of private

180

In particular, they rely on Callaghanv. Myers, 128 U.S. 617 (1888), which held

copyrightable a private court reporter's headnotes and syllabi, and Howell v. Miller, 91 F. 129 (6th
Cir. 1898), which dealt with a privately prepared statutory code. See Brief for Petitioners, supra
note 11, at 37, 41-42.
181 See supra Section II.A-.B.
182 See discussion supra notes 64-67 and accompanying
text.
183 See discussion supra notes 75-82 and accompanying text.
184 Starting in 1882, the Public Bill Office prepared summaries of bills introduced in
Parliament. See MAY, supra note 111, at 442; 260 PARL. DEB., H.C. (3d ser.) (1881) 423-24
(Eng.). These summaries are now published and called "explanatory notes." See CABINET OFFICE,
GUIDE TO MAKING LEGISLATION para. 11.9, at 78 (July 2017). "Briefs" attached to bills in
Parliament date back to at least the 17th century, but it is likely that the briefs were never made
public. See MAY, supra note 111, at 441; 6 H.C. JOuR. 570 (1651) (resolving that "Mr. Speaker
ought not to open any Bill, nor to command the same to be read, unless a Brief thereof be first
delivered unto him").
185 See discussion supra notes 140-160 and accompanying text.
186 Cf Tussey, supra note 16, at 174 n.1 (1998) (distinguishing "primary law," the "direct
products of judicial, legislative, and executive action," from "[s]econdary law" made up of
"treatises, casebooks, encyclopedias, and practice guides"). Unsurprisingly, contemporary
commentators classify case reports as state-promulgated works because, today, they frequently
are. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 41 l(a) (2018) (providing for printing of the UnitedStates Reports).
187 See discussion supra notes 61-67 and accompanying text.
188 See 2 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 87, at 532-36; Michael Bryan, Early English Law

Reporting,4 U. MELB. COLLECTIONS 45, 46 (2009).
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compilers-Plowden, Dyer, Coke.189 When Lord Coke opined in Dr.Bonham's
Case190 that the king's statutes were not above the law (an early exercise of judicial
review), James I kicked him off the court and then in 1616 ordered Coke to "correct
his Reports" of the case.191 Coke refused, and because the reports were his own and
19 2
not the Crown's, he could.
To be sure, the common law printing patent encompassed treatises in addition
to Year Books, perhaps implying that England placed private treatises on the same
level as case law.193 But insofar as the Crown at that time had a "custom of granting
privileges for the printing of whole classes of books" besides legal texts, 19 4 the fact
that Littleton's treatise on land tenures was one such monopoly is not indicative of
much.
When states such as Georgia deem their official annotated codes akin to
treatises and case reports, it grates against history that has long treated official codes
as mouthpieces of the state. That a private firm under state commission often holds
the pen in preparing these codes is of little consequence: the Justinian Digest195 and
Virginia codes 19 6 were also privately authored under commission and subsequently
ratified. Nor is there much weight to the states' supposedly benign motive of using
copyright to subsidize production of annotations 19 7-the state was free to subsidize
a private treatise under a private publisher's own name; that would make for a
different case but also for a far less valuable treatise owing to the absence of
"Official" on the cover.
The inescapable conclusion is that by designating an annotated code as
official, a state is not an ordinary market participant. It instead taps into a long arc
of history of sovereigns propounding their will through pronouncements, binding or
not, upon their citizens. Those pronouncements are part and parcel of the law, and
they are edicts of government to which citizens are entitled access.

189 See W.S. HOLDSWORTH, SOURCES AND LITERATURE OF ENGLISH LAW 89-90 (1925).
190 Thomas Bonham v. Coll. of Physicians (Dr. Bonham's Case), [1610] 77 Eng. Rep. 638

(C.P.).
191 Theodore F.T. Plucknett, Bonham's Case and JudicialReview, 40 HARV. L. REV. 30, 50
(1926).
192

See id. at 49-50.

193 See Byrom, supra note 92, at 223-24.
194

See id. at 229.

See Dingledy, supra note 64, at 235.
See discussion supra notes 143-160 and accompanying text.
197 See Brief for Arkansas et al., supra note 9, at 20-23.
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CONCLUSION

The English jurist Sir Frederick Pollock posited that "the greater have been a
lawyer's opportunities of knowledge, and the more time he has given to the study of
legal principles, the greater will be his hesitation in the face of the apparently simple
' The State of Georgia and others (and Pollock, for that
question, What is Law?"198
matter) suppose a simple answer: the law is statutes, and nothing more. Yet history
stretching as far back as ancient Rome and China refutes that simple equation. The
law is and long has been an amalgam of texts of varying levels of compulsion,
including commentary, dicta, preambles, and indeed annotations.
The history reviewed in this article demonstrates governments sometimes
aggressively promoting publication and enjoying the benefits of doing so, and
sometimes vigorously opposing publication in ways that reveal substantial harms to
society. That history, in the end, demonstrates that the value of access to the law,
with which copyright can interfere, spans beyond binding statutory texts;
foundational principles of limited government, popular sovereignty, and basic
liberty depend on access to the law in whole.
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